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Abstract
We introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange
is where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. These days, all big exchanges use
computer algorithms that implement double sided auctions to match buy and sell requests and
these algorithms must abide by certain regulatory guidelines. For example, market regulators
enforce that a matching produced by exchanges should be fair, uniform and individual rational.
To verify these properties of trades, we first formally define these notions in a theorem prover
and then give formal proofs of relevant results on matchings. Finally, we use this framework to
verify properties of two important classes of double sided auctions. All the definitions and results
presented in this paper are completely formalized in the Coq proof assistant without adding any
additional axioms to it.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets.
Trading is a principal component of all modern economies. Over the past few centuries,
more and more complex instruments are being introduced for trade in the financial markets.
All big stock exchanges use computer algorithms to match buy requests (demands) with sell
requests (supplies) of traders. Computer algorithms are also used by traders to place orders
in the markets.1 With the arrival of computer assisted trading, the volume and liquidity
in the markets have increased drastically and as a result, the markets have become more
complex.
Software programs that enable the whole trading process are extremely complex and
have to meet high efficiency criterion as they operate on massive amounts of data and in
real time. Furthermore, to increase the confidence of traders in the markets, the market
regulators set stringent safety and fairness guidelines for these software. Traditionally, to
meet such criteria, software development has extensively relied on testing the programs on
large data sets. Although testing is helpful in identifying bugs, it cannot guarantee the
absence of bugs. Even small bugs in the trading software can have a catastrophic effect on
the overall economy. An adversary might exploit a bug to his benefit and to the disadvantage
of other genuine traders. These events are certainly undesirable in a healthy economy.
Recently, there have been various instances [1, 2, 3] of violation of the trading rules by
the stock exchanges. For example, in [1], a regulator noted: "NYSE Arca failed to execute
a certain type of limit order under specified market conditions despite having a rule in
1 This is known as algorithmic trading.
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effect that stated that NYSE Arca would execute such orders"2. This is an instance of a
program not meeting its specification. Here the program is a matching algorithm used by
the exchange and the regulatory guidelines are the broad specifications for the program.
Note that, in most of the cases, the guidelines stated by the regulators are not a complete
specification of the program. Moreover, there is no formal guarantee that these guidelines are
consistent. These are some serious issues potentially compromising the safety and integrity
of the markets.
Recent advances in formal methods in computer science can be put to good use in
ensuring safe and fair financial markets. During the last few decades, formal method tools
have been increasingly successful in proving the correctness of large software and hardware
systems [9, 8, 12, 10]. While Model checking tools have been used for the verification of
hardware, the use of Interactive theorem provers have been quite successful in the verification
of large software. A formal verification of financial algorithms using these tools can be
helpful in the rigorous analysis of market behaviour at large. The matching algorithms
used by the exchanges (venues) are at the core of the broad spectrum of algorithms used in
financial markets. A formal framework for verifying matching algorithms can also be useful
in verifying other algorithms in financial markets.
1.1 An overview of trading at an exchange
An exchange is an organised financial market. There are various types of exchanges: stock
exchange, commodity exchange, foreign exchange etc. An exchange facilitates trading
between buyers and sellers for the products which are registered at the exchange. A poten-
tial trader (buyer or seller) places orders in the markets for a certain product. These orders
are matched by the stock exchange to execute trades. Most stock exchanges hold trading
in two main sessions: pre-market (or auction session) and continuous market (or regular
trading session).
The pre-market session reduces uncertainty and volatility in the market by discovering
the opening price of the product. During the pre-market session, an exchange collects
all the buy requests (bids) and sell requests (asks) for a fixed duration. At the end of
this duration the exchange matches these buy and sell requests at a single price using a
matching algorithm. In the continuous market session, the incoming buyers and sellers are
continuously matched to each other. An incoming bid (ask), if matchable, is immediately
matched to the existing asks (bids). Otherwise, if the bid (ask) is not matchable, it is placed
in a priority queue prioritised by price. A trader can place orders of multiple quantity of
each product to trade during both the sessions. However, for the analysis of the markets, it
suffices to assume that each order is of a single unit of a single product; a multiple quantity
order can always be treated as a bunch of orders each with a single quantity and the analysis
for a single product will apply for all the products individually. As a result, note that a
single trader who places an order of multiple units is seen as multiple traders ordering a
single unit each, even in the continuous market. Thus, in both sessions of trade, multiple
buyers and sellers are matched simultaneously. A mechanism used to match multiple buyers
and sellers is known as the double sided auction [7].
In double sided auctions, an auctioneer (e.g. exchanges) collects buy and sell requests
over a period of time. Each potential trader places the orders with a limit price: below
2 The New York Stock Exchange and the Archipelago Exchange merged together to form NYSE Arca,
which is an exchange where both stocks and options are traded.
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which a seller will not sell and above which a buyer will not buy. The exchange at the end
of this time period matches these orders based on their limit prices. This entire process is
completed using a double sided auction matching algorithm. Designing algorithms for double
sided auctions is well studied [13, 17, 14]. A major emphasis of many of these studies have
been to either maximize the number of matches or maximize the profit of the auctioneer.
In the auction theory literature, the profit of an auctioneer is defined as the difference
between the limit prices of matched bid-ask pair. However, most exchanges today earn their
profit by charging transaction costs to the traders. Therefore, maximizing the number of
matches increases the profit of the exchange as well as the liquidity in the markets. There
are other important properties, like fairness, uniformity and individual rationality, besides
the number of matches which are considered while evaluating the effectiveness of a matching
algorithm. However, it is known that no single algorithm can possess all of these properties
simultaneously [17, 13].
1.2 Related work
There is no prior work known to us which formalizes financial algorithms used by the ex-
changes. Passmore and Ignatovich in [15] highlight the significance, opportunities and chal-
lenges involved in formalizing financial markets. Their work describes in detail the whole
spectrum of financial algorithms that need to be verified for ensuring safe and fair markets.
Matching algorithms used by the exchanges are at the core of this whole spectrum.
On the other hand, there are quite a few works formalizing various concepts from auction
theory [6, 11, 16]. Most of these works focus on the Vickrey auction mechanism. In Vickrey
auction, there is a single seller with different items and multiple buyers with valuations for
every subsets of items. Each buyer places bids for every combination of the items. At the
end of bidding, the aim of seller is to maximise total value of the items by suitably assigning
the items to the buyers.
1.3 Our contribution
In this work, we formally define various notions from auction theory relevant for the analysis
of trades in financial markets. We define notions like bids, asks and matching in the Coq
proof assistant. The dependent types of Coq turn out to be very useful in giving concise
representation to these notions, which also reflects their natural definitions. After preparing
the basic framework, we define important properties of matching in a double sided auc-
tion: fairness, uniformity, maximality and individual rationality. These properties reflect
various regulatory guidelines for trading. Furthermore, we formally prove some results on
the existence of various combinations of these properties. For example, fairness and max-
imality can always be achieved simultaneously. These results can also be interpreted as
consistency proofs for various subsets of regulatory guidelines. We prove all these results
in the constructive setting of the Coq proof assistant without adding any additional axioms
to it. These proofs are completed using computable functions which computes the actual
instances (certificate). We also use computable functions to represent various predicates on
lists. Finally, we use this setting to verify properties of two important classes of matching
algorithms: dynamic price and uniform price algorithms.
In Section 2, we formally define the theory of double sided auctions. In Section 3, we
define and prove some important properties of matching algorithms in double sided auctions.
In particular we present a dynamic price matching algorithm which produces a maximum as
well as a fair matching. In Section 3.3, we describe a uniform price matching algorithm used
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for price discovery in financial markets. Moreover, we prove that it produces a matching
which is maximal among all possible uniform matchings. We summarise the work in Section 4
with an overview of possible future works. The Coq formalization for notions and proofs in
this paper is available at [4].
2 Modeling double sided auctions
An auction is a competitive event, where goods and services are sold to the most competitive
participants. The priority among participating traders is decided by various attributes of
the bids and asks (e.g. price, time etc). This priority can be finally represented by ordering
them in a sequence. Sequences are best represented using the list data structure in the Coq
standard library [5].
2.1 Bid, Ask and limit price
In any double sided auction multiple buyers and sellers place their orders to buy or sell a
unit of an underlying product. The auctioneer matches these buy-sell requests based on
their limit prices. While the limit price for a buy order (i.e. bid) is the price above which
the buyer does not want to buy the item, the limit price of a sell order (i.e. ask) is the
price below which the seller does not want to sell the item. If a trader wishes to buy or sell
multiple units, he can create multiple bids or asks with different ids.
We can express bids as well asks using records containing two fields.
Record Bid: Type := Mk_bid { bp:> nat; idb: nat }.
Record Ask: Type := Mk_ask { sp:> nat; ida: nat }.
For a bid b, (bp b) is the limit price and (idb b) is its unique identifier. Similarly for an
ask a, (sp a) is the limit price and (ida a) is the unique identifier of a. Note that the limit
prices are natural numbers when expressed in the monetary unit of the lowest denomination
(like cents in USA). Also note the use of coercion symbol :> in the first field of Bid. It
declares bp as an implicit function which is applied to any term of type Bid appearing in
a context where a natural number is expected. Hence from now on we can simply use b
instead of (bp b) to express the limit price of b. Similarly we can use a for the limit price of
an ask a.
Since equality for both the fields of Bid as well as Ask is decidable (i.e. nat: eqType),
the equality on Bid as well as Ask can also be proved decidable. This is achieved by declaring
two canonical instances bid_eqType and ask_eqType which connect Bid and Ask to the
eqType.
2.2 Matching in Double Sided Auctions
All the buy and sell requests can be assumed to be present in list B and list A respectively.
At the time of auction, the auctioneer matches bids in B to asks in A. We say a bid-ask pair
(b, a) is matchable if b ≥ a (i.e. bp b ≥ sp a). Furthermore, the auctioneer assigns a trade
price to each matched bid-ask pair. This process results in a matching M , which consists of
all the matched bid-ask pairs together with their trade prices. We define matching as a list
whose entries are of type fill_type.
Record fill_type: Type:= Mk_fill {bid_of: Bid; ask_of: Ask; tp: nat}
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In a matching M , a bid or an ask appears at most once. Note that there might be some
bids in B which are not matched to any asks in M . Similarly there might be some asks in
A which are not matched to any bids in M . The list of bids present in M is denoted by BM
and the list of asks present in M is denoted by AM . For example, Fig. 1 shows a matching
M between list of bids B and list of asks A. Note that the bid with limit price 37 is not
present in BM since it is not matched to any ask in M .
] ] ]] ] ] ] ]
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M
Figure 1 Bids in B and asks in A are represented using right and left brackets respectively along
with their limit prices. Every matched bid-ask pair in M is shown using brackets of same colors.
Bids with limit prices 37, 83 and 120 are not matched to any ask in the matching M .
More precisely, for a given list of bids B and list of asks A, M is a matching iff, (1) All
the bid-ask pairs in M are matchable, (2) BM is duplicate-free, (3) AM is duplicate-free,
(4) BM ⊆ B, and (5) AM ⊆ A.
I Definition 1. matching_in B A M := All_matchable M ∧ NoDup BM ∧ NoDup AM
∧ BM ⊆ B ∧ AM ⊆ A.
The term NoDup BM in the above definition indicates that each bid is a request to trade
one unit of item and the items are indivisible. We use the expression BM ⊆ B to denote the
term (Subset BM B). It expresses the fact that each element in the list BM is also present
in the list B. While the predicates NoDup and Subset are sufficient to express the notion of
a matching, we need more definitions to describe the properties of matching in double sided
auctions. In Fig 2 we describe three binary relations on lists namely sublist, included
and perm which are useful in stating some intermediate lemmas leading to important results
on matching. For example, consider the following lemma which states that the property of
being a matching is invariant under permutation.
I Lemma 2. match_inv: perm M M’ -> perm B B’ -> perm A A’ -> matching_in B
A M -> matching_in B’ A’ M’.
Note that the notion of permutation for lists is analogous to the equality in multisets.
More precisely, we have the following lemmas specifying the perm relation.
I Lemma 3. perm_intro: (∀ a, count a l = count a s) -> perm l s.
I Lemma 4. perm_elim: perm l s -> (∀ a, count a l = count a s).
The term (count a l ) in Lemma 3 represents the number of occurrences of element a in
the list l. In proving various properties of a matching M we very often base our arguments
solely on the information present in BM , AM and PM . Therefore it is useful to have lemmas
establishing the interaction of BM , AM and PM with above mentioned relations on lists.
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Figure 2 The dotted lines between the entries of lists confirm the presence of these entries in
both the lists. (a) If L1 is sublist of L2 then every entry of L1 is also present in L2 and they
appear in the same succession. (b) A list L1 is included in L2 if every entry in L1 is also present
in L2. (c) Two lists L1 and L2 are permutation of each other if each entry has same number of
occurrences in both L1 and L2.
I Lemma 5. included_M_imp_included_bids:included M M ′ -> included BM BM ′
.
I Lemma 6. included_M_imp_included_asks:included M M ′ -> included AM AM ′
The notion of included in above lemmas is similar to subset relation on multisets. We
have the following lemmas specifying the exact behaviour of included relation.
I Lemma 7. included_intro: (∀ a, count a l ≤ count a s)-> included l s.
I Lemma 8. included_elim: included l s -> (∀ a, count a l ≤ count a s).
In this work, we come across various processes whose input and output are lists. We
need the sublist relation, which is similar to the subsequence relation, to properly specify
the behaviour of these processes.
I Lemma 9. sublist_intro1 (a:T): sublist l s-> sublist l (a::s).
I Lemma 10. sublist_elim3a (a e:T): sublist (a::l)(e::s)-> sublist l s.
Note the recursive nature of sublist as evident in Lemma 10. It makes inductive
reasoning easier for the statements which contain sublist in the antecedent. However, this
is not true for the other relations (i.e. included and perm).
3 Analysis of Double sided auctions
In this, work we do not consider analysis of profit for the auctioneer. Therefore the buyer
of a matched bid-ask pair pays the same amount which the seller receives. This price for
a matched bid-ask pair is called the trade price for that pair. Since the limit price for a
buyer is the price above which she does not want to buy, the trade price for this buyer is
expected to be below its limit price. Similarly the trade price for the seller is expected to
be above its limit price. Therefore in any matching it is desired that the trade price of a
bid-ask pair lies between their limit prices. A matching which has this property is called
an individual rational (IR) matching. Note that any matching can be converted to an IR
matching without altering its bid-ask pair (See Fig 3).
The number of matched bid-ask pairs produced by a matching algorithm is crucial in
the design of a double sided auction mechanism. Increasing the number of matched bid-ask
pairs increases liquidity in the market. Therefore, producing a maximum matching is an
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Figure 3 The colored dots represent the trade prices at which the corresponding matched bid-ask
pairs are traded. While the matching M2 is not IR since some dots lie outside the corresponding
matched bid ask-pair. The matching M1 is IR because trade prices for every matched bid-ask pair
lie inside the interval. Note that the matching M1 and M2 contains exactly the same bid-ask pairs.
important aspect of double sided auction mechanism design. For a given list of bids B and
list of asks A we say a matching M is a maximum matching if no other matching M ′ on the
same B and A contains more matched bid-ask pairs than M .
I Definition 11. Is_MM M B A := (matching_in B A M) ∧ (∀ M’, matching_in B A
M’ → |M’| ≤ |M|).
In certain situations, to produce a maximum matching, different bid-ask pairs must be
assigned different trade prices (Fig 4). However, different prices for the same product
in the same market simultaneously leads to dissatisfaction amongst some of the traders. A
mechanism which clears all the matched bid-ask pairs at same trade price is called a uniform
matching. It is also known as perceived-fairness.
100
80
(a) UM (b) MM
70
90
B A
100
80
70
90
B A
Figure 4 In this case the only individually rational matching of size two it is not uniform.
3.1 Fairness
A bid with higher limit price is more competitive compared to bids with lower limit prices.
Similarly an ask with lower limit price is more competitive compared to asks with higher
limit prices. In a competitive market more competitive traders are prioritised for matching.
A matching which prioritises more competitive traders is called a fair matching.
I Definition 12. fair_on_bids M B:= ∀ b b’, In b B ∧ In b’ B -> b > b’ -> In
b’ BM -> In b BM.
I Definition 13. fair_on_asks M A:= ∀ s s’, In s A ∧ In s’ A -> s < s’ -> In
s’ AM -> In s AM.
I Definition 14. Is_fair M B A:= fair_on_asks M A ∧ fair_on_bids M B.
Here, the predicate fair_on_bids M B states that the matching M is fair for the list of
buyers B. Similarly, the predicate fair_on_asks M A states that the matching M is fair
for the list of sellers A. A matching which is fair on bids as well as ask is expressed using
the predicate Is_fair M B A.
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Unlike the uniform matching, a fair matching can always be achieved without comprom-
ising the size of matching. We can accomplish this by converting any matching into a fair
matching without changing its size. For example, consider the following function make_FOB.
Fixpoint Make_FOB (M:list fill_type) (B: list Bid):=
match (M,B) with
|(nil,_) => nil
|(m::M’,nil) => nil
|(m::M’,b::B’) => (Mk_fill b (ask_of m) (tp m))::(Make_FOB M’ B’)
end.
The function make_FOB produces a fair_on_bids matching from a given matching M
and a list of bids B, both sorted in decreasing order of bid prices (See Fig 5). Note that
make_FOB doesn’t change any of the ask in M and due to the recursive nature of make_FOB on
B, a bid is not repeated in the process of replacement. Hence the new BM is duplicate-free.
Once we get a fair matching on bids, we use similar function make_FOA to produce a fair
matching.
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Make FOB Make FOA
M1 M2 M3
Figure 5 The dotted lines in this figure represent matched bid-ask pairs in matching M1, M2
and M3. In the first step function make_FOB operates on M1 recursively. At each step it picks the
top bid-ask pair, say (b, a) in M1 and replaces the bid b with a most competitive bid available in B.
The result of this process is a fair_on_bids matching M2. In a similar way the function make_FOA
changes M2 intro a fair on ask matching M3.
More precisely, for the function make_FOB and make_FOA we have the following lemmas
proving it fair on bids and fair on asks respectively.
I Lemma 15. mfob_fair_on_bid M B: (Sorted M) -> (Sorted B) -> sublist PBM
PB -> fair_on_bids (Make_FOB M B) B.
I Lemma 16. mfob_fair_on_ask M A: (Sorted M) -> (Sorted A) -> sublist PAM
PA -> fair_on_asks (Make_FOA M A) A.
I Theorem 17. exists_fair_matching (Nb: NoDup B)(Na: NoDup A): matching_in
B A M -> ( ∃ M’, matching_in B A M’ ∧ Is_fair M’ B A ∧ |M| = |M’|).
Proof of Theorem 17 depends on Lemma 16 and Lemma 15. Furthermore, Lemma 16
and Lemma 15 can be proved using induction on the size of M.
3.2 Maximum Matching
The liquidity in any market is a measure of how quickly one can trade in the market without
much cost. One way to increase the liquidity is to maximize the number of matched bid-ask
pairs. In the previous section we have seen that any matching can be changed to a fair
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matching without altering its size. Therefore, we can have a maximum matching without
compromising on the fairness of the matching. In this section we describe a matching which
is fair as well as maximal. For a given list of bid B and list of ask A, a maximum and
fair matching can be achieved in two steps. In the first step we apply function produce_MM
which produces a matching which is maximal and fair on bids. In the next step we apply
make_FOA to this maximum matching to produce a fair matching (See Fig 6).
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Figure 6 In the first step, the function produce_MM operates recursively on the list of bids B and
list of asks A. At each iteration produce_MM selects a most competitive available bid and then pairs
it with the largest matchable ask. The output of this function is fair on bids since it doesn’t leave
any bid from top. In the second step, the function make_FOA converts M1 into fair matching M2.
Fixpoint produce_MM (B:list Bid) (A: list Ask): (list fill_type) :=
match (B, A) with
|(nil, _) => nil
|(b::B’, nil) => nil
|(b::B’, a::A’) => match (a <= b) with
|true => ({|bid_of:= b; ask_of:= a; tp:=(bp b)|})::(produce_MM B’ A’)
|false => produce_MM B A’
end
end.
At each iteration produce_MM generates a matchable bid-ask pair (See Fig 6). Due to the
recursive nature of function produce_MM on both B and A, it never pairs any bid with more
than one asks. This ensures that the list of bids in matching (i.e. BM ) is duplicate-free. Note
that produce_MM tries to match a bid until it finds a matchable ask. The function terminates
when either all the bids are matched or it encounters a bid for which no matchable ask is
available. Therefore, the function produce_MM produces a matching from a given lists of bids
B and a list of asks A, both sorted in decreasing order by there limit prices. The following
theorem states that the function produce_MM produces a maximum matching when both B
and A are sorted in decreasing order by limit prices.
I Theorem 18. produce_MM_is_MM(Nb:NoDup B)(Na:NoDup A): Sorted B -> Sorted A
-> Is_MM (produce_MM B A) B A.
Proof : We prove this result using induction on the size of list A.
Induction hypothesis (IH): ∀ A’, |A’| < |A| -> ∀ B, Sorted B -> Sorted A’ ->
Is_MM (produce_MM B A’) B A’.
Let M be an arbitrary matching on the list of bids B and list of asks A. Moreover, assume
that b and a are the topmost bid and ask present in B and A respectively (i.e. A = (a :: A′)
and B = (b :: B′)). We prove |M | ≤ |produce_MM B A| in the following two cases.
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Case-1 (b < a): In this case the limit price of a is strictly more than the limit price of
b. In this case the function produce_MM computes a matching on B and A′. Note that
due to the induction hypotheses (i.e. IH) this is a maximum matching for B and A′.
Since the limit price of ask a is more than the most competitive bid b in B it cannot be
present in any matching of B and A. Therefore a maximum matching on B and A′ is
also a maximum matching on B and A. Hence we have |M | ≤ | produce_MM B A |.
Case-2 (a ≤ b): In this case produce_MM produces a matching of size m+ 1 where m is
the size of matching produce_MM B′ A′. We need to prove that |M | ≤ m+1. Note that
due to induction hypothesis (i.e. IH) the matching produce_MM B′ A′ is a maximum
matching on B′ and A′. Hence no matching on B′ and A′ can have size bigger than m.
Without loss of generality we can assume that M is also sorted in decreasing order of
bid prices. Now we further split this case into the following five sub cases (see Fig 7).
(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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A
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a
′
a
′
a
′
b
′
b
′
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Figure 7 This figure shows all the five sub cases of Case-2 (i.e. when b ≥ a). The dotted line
shows presence of the connected pair in matching M . Both the list of bids B and list of asks A are
sorted in decreasing order of their limit prices. Moreover, we assume B = b :: B′ and A = a :: A′.
Case-2A (M = (b, a) :: M ′) : In this case bid b is matched to ask a in the matching
M (see Fig 7 (a)). Note that M ′ is a matching on B′ and A′. Since |M ′| ≤ m we
have |M | = |M ′|+ 1 ≤ m+ 1.
Case-2B (b /∈ BM ∧ a /∈ AM ) : In this case neither bid b nor ask a is present in
matching M (see Fig 7 (b)). Therefore M is a matching on B′ and A′. Hence we have
|M | ≤ m < m+ 1.
Case-2C (b, a′) ∈M ∧ (b′, a) ∈M : In this case we have (b, a′) ∈M and (b′, a) ∈M
where a′ ∈ A′ and b′ ∈ B′. We can obtain another matching M1 of same size as M
(see Fig 7 (c)) where (b, a) ∈M1 and (b′, a′) ∈M1. Note that all other entries of M1
is same as M . Therefore we have M1 = (b, a) :: M ′ where M ′ is a matching on B′
and A′. Since |M ′| ≤ m we have |M | = |M1| ≤ m+ 1.
Case-2D: (b, a′) ∈M ∧ a /∈ AM : In this case we have (b, a′) ∈M and a /∈ AM where
a′ ∈ A′. We can obtain another matching M1 of same size as M (see Fig 7 (d)) where
(b, a) ∈ M1. Therefore we have M1 = (b, a) :: M ′ where M ′ is a matching on B′ and
A′. Since |M ′| ≤ m we have |M | = |M1| ≤ m+ 1.
Case-2E: (b′, a) ∈M ∧ b /∈ BM : In this case we have (b′, a) ∈M and b /∈ BM where
b′ ∈ B′. We can obtain another matching M1 of same size as M (see Fig 7 (e)) where
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(b, a) ∈ M1. Therefore we have M1 = (b, a) :: M ′ where M ′ is a matching on B′ and
A′. Since |M ′| ≤ m we have |M | = |M1| ≤ m+ 1.
Note that all the cases in the above proof correspond to predicates which can be expressed
using only the membership predicate on lists. Since we have decidable equality on the
elements of the lists all these predicates are also decidable. Hence, we can do case analysis
on them without assuming any axiom. 
Now that we proved the maximality property of produce_MM we can produce a fair as
well as maximal matching by applying the functions Make_FOA and Make_FOB to the output
of produce_MM. More precisely, for a given list of bids B and list of asks A, we have following
result stating that there exists a matching which is both maximal and fair.
I Theorem 19. exists_fair_maximum (B: list Bid)(A: list Ask): ∃ M, (Is_fair
M B A ∧ Is_MM M B A).
3.3 Matching in financial markets
An important aspect of the pre-market session is to discover a single price (equilibrium
price) at which maximum demand and supply can be matched. Most exchanges execute
trade during this session at an equilibrium price. Consider the function UM which produces
an individually rational matching which is fair and maximal among all uniform matchings.
Fixpoint produce_UM (B:list Bid) (A:list Ask) :=
match (B,A) with
|(nil, _) => nil
|(_,nil)=> nil
|(b::B’,a::A’) => match (a <= b) with
|false =>nil
|true => ({|bid_of:= b; ask_of:= a; tp:=(bp b)|})::produce_UM B’ A’
end
end.
Definition uniform_price B A := bp (bid_of (last (produce_UM B A))).
Definition UM B A:= replace_column (produce_UM B A) (uniform_price B A).
The function produce_UM produces bid-ask pairs, uniform_price computes the uniform
price and finally UM produces a uniform matching. The function produce_UM is recursive
and matches the largest available bid in B with the smallest available ask in A at each
iteration (See Fig 8). This function terminates when the most competitive bid available
in B is not matchable with any available ask in A. The following theorem states that the
function produce_UM produces a maximal matching among all uniform matchings when the
list of bids B is sorted in decreasing order by limit prices and the list of asks A is sorted in
increasing order by limit prices.
I Theorem 20. UM_is_maximal_Uniform (B: list Bid) (A:list Ask): Sorted B ->
Sorted A -> ∀ M: list fill_type, Is_uniform M -> |M| ≤ | (UM B A ) |
Proof : Let M be any arbitrary IR and uniform matching on the list of bids B and list
of asks A where each matched bid-ask pair is traded at price t. We need to prove that m ≤
|(UM B A)| where m is the number of matched bid-ask pairs in the matching M . Observe
that in any individually rational and uniform matching the number of bids above the trade
price is same as the number of asks below the trade price (See Fig 9). Therefore, there are
at least m bids above t and m asks below t in B and A respectively.
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Figure 8 (a) The dotted lines indicate all the bid-ask pair produced by function produce_UM.
In each iteration function produce_UM matches the largest available bid in B with the smallest
available ask in A. (b) The dotted lines here indicate a maximum matching for the list of bids B
and list of asks A. Note that in this case the matching produced by UM is not a maximum matching.
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Figure 9 Trade price p for the matching M is shown using a dot that lies between the ask with
limit price 90 and bid with limit price 91. Note that since M is individually rational the number of
matched asks below the trade price p is same as number of matched bids above the trade price p.
Since at each step the function produce_UM pairs the largest bid available in B with the
smallest ask available in A it must produce at least m bid-ask pairs. Hence for the list of
bids B and list of asks A the function UM produces a uniform matching which is of size at
least m. 
4 Conclusion
Trading activities in today’s financial markets are mostly enabled using computer algorithms.
These algorithms are extremely large and complex. Matching algorithms used by exchanges
(venues) are at the core of this broad range of financial algorithms [15]. To ensure safety
and integrity in the markets, the market regulators introduce guidelines specifying different
features for these algorithms. Traditional methods of software development, which focus on
testing, can not guarantee that these softwares meet the guidelines.
In this work, we develop a formal framework to verify some important properties of the
matching algorithms used by exchanges. These algorithms use double sided auctions to
match multiple buyers with multiple sellers during different sessions of trading. We use the
dependent types of Coq proof assistant to concisely represent various notions from auction
theory relevant for the verification of these algorithms. We formally verify two important
classes of double sided auctions (uniform price and dynamic price) in this framework.
In this work, we define each bid or ask as a request to trade a single unit of a product
and the product is indivisible. In the future this work can be extended to accommodate
trades involving multiple units of an item by introducing proper functions to generate bids
and asks of single unit from the buy and sell requests of multiple units. Another interesting
direction of work is to extend this work for different types of orders (e.g. limit orders,
market orders, stop-loss orders, iceberg orders etc) in continuous markets. It would require
maintaining a priority queue based on the various attributes of these orders. A formal
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verification of trading at an exchange will provide a formal foundation that can be used for
rigorous analysis of other financial algorithms (e.g. order routing, clearing and settlements
etc).
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